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26 U.S.C. § 5861(d) REQUIRES MENS REA
AS TO THE PHYSICAL
CHARACTERISTICS OF THE
WEAPON
Staples v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 1793 (1994)
I. INTRODUCTION
In Staples v. United States,1 the United States Supreme Court held
that 26 U.S.C. § 5861 (d)2 requires mens rea.3 Specifically, the Court,
reversing the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, ruled that the Govern-
ment was required to prove that the petitioner, Harold E. Staples, III,
knew the features of his weapon that brought it within the scope of
§ 5861 (d).4
This Note argues that the Court reached the wrong conclusion.
The petitioner should have been found guilty for violating § 5861 (d)
because he was "reckless" as to the fact that his weapon was a statutory
"firearm." This Note asserts that because the Court did not properly
analyze § 5861 (d), it failed to decide the proper mens rea that
§ 5861 (d) requires. The Court concluded that § 5861 (d) requires
only a single mens rea. This Note, however, argues that § 5861 (d)
actually requires three separate and distinct mens rea; one for each
objective element of § 5861 (d). This Note also argues that the re-
quired mens rea as to the physical characteristics of a weapon that
make it a statutory "firearm" is actually lower than the mens rea the
Court established. Unlike the "knowing" level of intent the Court re-
quired, this Note argues that "reckless" is a sufficient level of intent.
Additionally, this Note agrees with the Court's definition of what
items should alert a possessor of a weapon to the possibility of strict
regulation. However, this Note disagrees with how the Court applied
its definition to the facts of this case. The Court reasoned that guns
have enjoyed a tradition of legality in this country, and therefore
1 114 S. Ct. 1793 (1994).
2 26 U.S.C. § 5861(d) (1994) states: "It shall be unlawful for any person to receive or
possess a firearm which is not registered to him in the National Firearms Registration and
Transfer Record."




would not alert a possessor to the probability of strict regulation. The
gun involved in this case, however, had been visibly altered, and this
Note argues that visibly or knowingly altered weapons have not en-
joyed a tradition of legality in this country. Finally, this Note agrees
with the Court's conclusion that § 5861 (d) is not a public welfare of-
fense because it carries too harsh a penalty.
nI. BACKGROUND
Congress enacted the National Firearms Act (NFA), 26 U.S.C.
§§ 5801-5872, in 1934 in response to an increase in criminal gang ac-
tivity.5 With the NFA, Congress sought to curtail this rise in criminal
gang activity by depriving gangsters of their most dangerous weap-
ons.6 However, Congress did not want the NFA to restrict legitimate
gun use by hunters, sportsmen, and people who kept a weapon for
home protection.7 Therefore, Congress limited the NFA to only those
weapons that gangsters typically used.8 This category of weapons was
defined in the statute as "firearms," and included machine guns and
sawed-off shotguns.9 Congress felt that "there [was] no reason why
anyone except a law officer should have a machine gun or a sawed-off
shotgun."10
The NFA, however, was not an outright ban on statutory "fire-
arms."" Rather, the NFA required owners of "firearms" merely to reg-
ister their weapons with the government.' 2 Congress took this narrow
approach because it was afraid that the Supreme Court would strike
down an outright ban on "firearms" as an unconstitutional, federal
invasion into reserved state powers.' 3 Consequently, Congress, at the
5 Staples, 114 S. Ct. at 1808 (Stevens, J., dissenting). See also David Hardy, The Firearms
Owners, Protection Act: A Historical and Legal Perspective, 17 CumB. L REv. 585, 590-91 (1987).
6 S. REP. No. 1444, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 1-2 (1934). The Senate Report explained:
"The gangster as a law violator must be deprived of his most dangerous weapon, the
machine gun. Your committee is of the opinion that limiting the bill to the taxing of
sawed-off guns and machine guns is sufficient at this time." Id-
7 Id.
8 Id.
9 See H.R. REP. No. 1780, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934).
10 S. RFEP. No. 1444, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1934).
11 Hardy, supra note 5, at 591-92.
12 Staples v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 1793, 1808 (1994) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
13 The constitutionality of federal intervention in state actions was a controversial issue
in the 1930s. The Supreme Court of 1934 favored the states' right to conduct intrastate
activities under the Tenth Amendment without federal intervention. The Court viewed
federal intervention as an invasion of the states' police powers. The Court further exhib-
ited this view over the next few years with its decisions in Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United
States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935), and United States v. Butier, 297 U.S. 1 (1936). Then, in 1937,
four years after Congress enacted the NFA, the Court's attitude changed during the fa-
mous "switch in time that saved nine." This change of attitude ushered in a new era of
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express advice of Attorney General Cummings, modeled the NFA af-
ter the Narcotic Drug Act of 1914.14 The Narcotic Drug Act derived
its power from the taxing clause. 15 The Supreme Court had already
held that the Narcotic Drug Act was constitutional and did not invade
the states' reserved powers.16 Therefore, by modeling the NFA after
the Narcotic Drug Act, Congress hoped that the Court would construe
the NFA in a similar manner.1 7 In addition to this benefit, Congress
hoped that the courts would comparably construe NFA provisions that
were similar to Narcotic Drug Act provisions. 18 In particular, the
Supreme Court had already held that certain Narcotic Drug Act provi-
sions did not require proof that the defendant knew all of the facts
that made his conduct illegal. 19
United States v. Balint20 was one of the cases Congress hoped the
courts would use as a guide for interpreting the NFA.21 In Balint, the
defendants were charged with unlawfully selling restricted drugs with-
out a written order from the Commissioner of the Internal Revenue.
22
The defendants argued that the charges should be dismissed because
they did not know that the drugs they were selling were restricted.
23
The Supreme Court did not accept this argument.24 The Court ac-
knowledged that the common law required intent as a necessary ele-
ment of every crime.2 5 The Court further acknowledged that this was
true even when the statute was silent as to intent.2 6 However, when
the statute is promoting the public welfare, and proving intent would
hinder prosecution, the Court decided that the Government need not
prove that defendants knew their activities were illegal.2 7 These types
of statutes have become known as public welfare statutes.
2 8
more expansive federal powers. Hardy, supra note 5, at 591 n.27.
14 Id. at 591. Narcotic Drug Act, Pub. L. No. 63-223, 38 Stat. 785 (1914).
15 Hardy, supra note 5, at 591.
16 United States v. Doremus, 249 U.S. 86 (1919). Four Justices, including the Chief
Justice, dissented on grounds that the statute invaded the reserved police powers of the
state. Id. at 95.
17 National Firearms Act: Hearings on H.R. 9066 Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means,
73d Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1934). This explains why the NFA is in Title 26, the Internal Reve-
nue Code, rather than in Title 18, Crimes and Criminal Procedure.
18 Staples v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 1793, 1808 (1994) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
19 Id.
20 258 U.S. 250 (1922).
21 Staples, 114 S. Ct. at 1808 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
22 Balint, 258 U.S. at 251.
23 Id.
24 Id. at 254.
25 Id. at 251.
26 Id. at 251-52.
27 Id. at 252.
28 See Francis B. Sayre, Public Welfare Offenses, 33 COLuM. L. REa. 55 (1933).
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As Congress hoped, consistent with Balint, the courts uniformly
construed the NFA as not requiring proof that defendants knew their
acts were illegal.29 In other words, the courts did not require any
mens rea. For the first thirty years of its enforcement, the courts,
across the board, did not require proof of mens rea for an NFA
conviction.3 0
In 1971, the Supreme Court interpreted § 5861 (d) of the NFA in
United States v. Freed.31 In Freed, the Government indicted the defend-
ants for possessing and conspiring to possess unregistered hand gre-
nades in violation of § 5861(d).82 The District Court dismissed the
indictment,33 partly because it failed to allege that the defendants
knowingly did not register their hand grenades.3 The Supreme
Court, however, on direct appeal, reversed.3 5 The Court held that
§ 5861 (d) protected the public welfare, and as a result, similar to Ba-
lint, did not require proof that the defendants knew of the registration
requirement for hand grenades.3 6 The Court, however, never directly
29 Staples v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 1793, 1812 (1994) (Stevens, J., dissenting). See
United States v. Decker, 292 F.2d 89, 90 (6th Cir.), cert. denied; 868 U.S. 834 (1961); Sipes v.
United States, 321 F.2d 174, 179 (8th Cir.), cert. denieA, 375 U.S. 913 (1963); U.S. v. Wost,
148 F. Supp. 202, 204 (N.D., Ohio 1957).
30 Id. at 1812-13. "[1]n 1963, then-Judge Blackmun reviewed the earlier cases and con-
cluded that the defendant's knowledge that he possessed a gun was 'all the scienter which
the statute requires.' Sipes v. United States, 321 F.2d 174, 179 [(8th Cir.)], cert. denied, 375
U.S. 913 (1963)." Id.
Congress' treatment of the NFA over the years also supported the courts' interpreta-
tion of section 5861(d). Id. Congress amended the NFA twice, once in 1968 and again in
1986. Id. Each of these amendments added knowledge requirements to other portions of
the NFA, but neither amendment added a knowledge requirement to section 5861(d). Id.
Significantly, in the 1968 amendment, Congress added a mens rea requirement to section
5861 (1). 26 U.S.C. § 5861(1) (making it unlawful "to make, or cause the making of, a false
entry on any application, return, or record required by this chapter, knowing such entry to
be false"). Id. at 1813 n.21. "[Wihere Congress includes particular language in one sec-
tion of a statute but omits it in another section of the same Act, it is generally presumed
that Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion."
Rodriguez v. United States, 480 U.S. 522, 525 (1987) (internal quotation marks and cita-
tions omitted); see also Lawrence County v. Lead-Deadwood Sch. Dist. No. 40-1, 469 U.S.
256, 267-68 (1985).




35 Id. at 610.
36 Id. at 609. The Court distinguished cases like Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S.
246 (1952) (finding defendant could not be convicted of taking government property with-
out knowledge that the property belonged to the government), and Lambert v. California,
355 U.S. 225 (1957) (ruling unconstitutional a local ordinance making it a crime for a
felon to remain in Los Angeles for more than five days without registering with the chief of
police). The Court implicitly reasoned that the defendants in these two cases could not
have reasonably anticipated government regulation. Freed, 401 U.S. at 608-09.
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addressed the issue of whether the defendants had to know they were
possessing a statutory "firearm." The Court glazed over this issue be-
cause it felt the defendants knew they possessed an item which should
have alerted them to strict regulation; "one would hardly be surprised
to learn that possession of hand grenades is not an innocent act."
3 7
The Court did note, though, that "the only knowledge required to be
proved was knowledge that the instrument possessed was a firearm."38
Unfortunately, the Court never clearly defined whether it was refer-
ring to a firearm in the statutory or general sense.39 The Court was
probably referring to firearms in the general sense because the subse-
quent sentence of the opinion cited Sipes v. United States,40 a case
which referred to firearms in the general sense. The Court's failure to
explicitly define the term "firearm," and its flippant analysis of the
issue set the stage for the confusion which has developed around
§ 5861 (d).
For the twelve years after Freed, every federal court interpreting
§ 5861 (d) held that the mens rea required was only that defendants
knew they possessed a firearm in the general sense. 41 In 1983, in
United States v. Herbert,42 the Ninth Circuit broke away from this trend,
and held that the Government must prove that defendants knew the
internal characteristics of their weapon which made it a statutory "fire-
arm" when nothing external would have "alert[ed] one to the likeli-
hood of regulation. '43 After this decision, the circuit courts began to
split.44 Most circuits continued to follow the established line of prece-
dent, and did not require proof of any mens rea for conviction under
§ 5861 (d).45 For instance, in United States v. Ross,46 the Seventh Cir-
37 Freed, 401 U.S. at 609.
38 Id. at 607.
39 See id.
40 321 F.2d 174, 179 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 913 (1963).
41 Staples v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 1793, 1813 n.23 (1994) (Stevens,J., dissenting); see,
e.g., United States v. Gonzalez, 719 F.2d 1516, 1522 (11th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S.
1037 (1984); Morgan v. United States, 564 F.2d 803, 805-06 (8th Cir. 1977); United States
v. Cowper, 503 F.2d 130, 132-33 (6th Cir. 1974), cert. denied; 420 U.S. 930 (1975); United
States v. De Bartolo, 482 F.2d 312, 316 (1st Cir. 1973); United States v. Vasquez, 476 F.2d
730, 732 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 836 (1973), overuled by United States v. Anderson,
885 F.2d 1248 (5th Cir. 1989) (en banc).
42 698 F.2d 981 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 821 (1983).
43 Id. at 987.
44 United States v. Harris, 959 F.2d 246, 260 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 362
(1992).
45 United States v. Shilling, 826 F.2d 1365, 1367 (4th Cir. 1987), cert. denieA 484 U.S.
1043 (1988); United States v. Mittleider, 835 F.2d 769, 774 (10th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485
U.S. 980 (1988).
46 917 F.2d 997 (7th Cir. 1990), cert. denied 498 U.S. 1122 (1991), cert. granted and judg-
ment vacated, 114 S. Ct. 2129 (1994).
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cult, following the established precedent, held that § 5861 (d) did not
require mens rea.47 The court reasoned that since the Supreme
Court in Freed held that § 5861 (d) dispensed with mens rea for the
registration of the weapon, it implied that mens rea was also unneces-
sary as to a defendant knowing the characteristics of his "firearm."
48
The Tenth Circuit adopted this same logic. In United States v. Mit-
tleider,49 the Tenth Circuit, questioning the validity of the Herbert opin-
ion, upheld a jury instruction which did not require proof that the
defendant knew the weapon he possessed was a statutory "firearm."50
Other circuits, however, have disagreed with this reasoning, and
have concluded that § 5861 (d) requires mens rea.51 In United States v.
Anderson,52 for example, the defendant was arrested and convicted for
violating § 5861 (d).53 He possessed two automatic weapons and si-
lencer parts.54 The Fifth Circuit reversed the conviction because the
only proof that the jury instruction required was that the defendant
knew the guns were firearms in the general sense.55 The court was
concerned that juries would convict innocent defendants. 56 Under
the jury instruction, defendants who had no knowledge of the internal
characteristics of their weapon could have been convicted for possess-
ing a gun which had no external indications that it was a statutory
"firearm." 57 The court reasoned that Congress plainly did not intend
to imprison pistol owners, who innocently and reasonably believed
that their weapon was legal, because, unknown to them, it was modi-
47 Id. at 1000.
48 Id. The Seventh Circuit acknowledged the split that had developed over the years,
and acknowledged that the word "firearm" had a legal and a lay definition, but it con-
cluded this was all irrelevant in light of Freed. Id.
49 835 F.2d 769 (10th Cir. 1987), cert. denied 485 U.S. 980 (1988).
50 Id. at 774. Thisjury instruction was based on an instruction found in 2 E. DEvrrr AND
C. BLAcKR, FEDERAL JuRY PRACricE AND INSTRUCTIONS § 59.04 (Sd ed. 1977).
51 United States v. Anderson, 885 F.2d 1248 (5th Cir. 1989) (en banc); United States v.
Williams, 872 F.2d 773 (6th Cir. 1989); United States v. Harris, 959 F.2d 246 (D.C. Cir.),
crt. denied, 113 S. Ct. 362 (1992).
52 885 F.2d 1248 (5th Cir. 1989). A panel of the Fifth Circuit had affirmed Anderson's
conviction under an instruction requiring the jury to find him guilty if he knew the guns
were firearms in the general sense as opposed to knowing that they were statutory "fire-
arms." United States v. Anderson, 858 F.2d 313 (5th Cir. 1988). However, the panel ma-
jority urged that the case be reheard en banc to reexamine Fifth Circuit precedent. Id. at
317-21. The court granted the motion for a rehearing en banc. 885 F.2d at 1249.
53 Anderson, 885 F.2d at 1249.
54 Id.
55 Id. at 1249-50. The court held that the proper instruction for a jury instruction is
that the defendant must have knowledge that the weapon was a "firearm" according to the
NFA. Id. at 1255-56.
56 Id. at 1250.
57 Id. at 1251.
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fled to be fully automatic.58 Consequently, the court held that for a
§ 5861 (d) conviction, the government must prove that the defendant
knew the weapons were statutory "firearms."59
The District of Columbia Circuit, in United States v. Harris,
60
agreed with the Fifth Circuit's reasoning in Anderson. It also held that
a § 5861 (d) conviction requires proof that the defendant knew he
possessed a statutory "firearm."61 To further support this conclusion,
the court in Harris advanced two additional arguments. First, the
court highlighted the fact that Congress, through the NFA, limited
gun registration to only "highly dangerous" weapons. 62 Therefore,
the court stated that if it adopted a standard that would allow a de-
fendant to be convicted for knowingly possessing a gun of any type,
the defendant would be absolutely liable for possessing a statutory
"firearm."63 The court held that this would effectively expand Con-
gress' registration requirement to cover all guns.64 Second, the Court
found that requiring mens rea would "comport[ ] better with the
traditional understanding of the criminal law as punishing only truly
culpable conduct."65 The court relied on Liparota v. United States66 to
support this contention. In Liparota, the Supreme Court held that
convictions under the federal statute governing food stamp fraud, 7
U.S.C. § 2024(b) (1), which is also silent as to the required mens rea,
require proof that the defendant knew his conduct was prohibited by
statute or regulations. 67 The Supreme Court reasoned that interpret-
ing a statute as requiring mens rea is especially necessary if to inter-
pret otherwise would "criminalize a broad range of apparently
innocent conduct."68 The court in Harris concluded that the case
before it was similar to Liparota, and therefore, to interpret § 5861 (d)
as not requiring mens rea would also "criminalize a broad range of
apparently innocent conducL"
69
58 Id. at 1254.
59 Id. at 1249.
60 959 F.2d 246 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 362 (1992).
61 Id. at 261.
62 Id. at 260.
63 Id.
64 Id.
65 Id. The court acknowledged the split on the issue and then followed the lead of the
Fifth, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits. Id.
66 471 U.S. 419 (1985).
67 Id. at 425.
68 Id. at 426.
69 Harris, 959 F.2d at 261.
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Ill. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On 29 December 1989,70 local police and the Bureau of Alcohol,
Tobacco and Firearms (BATF) executed a search warrant on peti-
tioner, Harold E. Staples, III, at his home.71 One of the items they
recovered was an AR-15 assault rifle.72 The AR-15 is the civilian ver-
sion of the military's fully automatic M-16 rifle.73 Unless modified,
the AR-15 is a semiautomatic weapon.74 The National Firearms Act
(NFA), 26 U.S.C. §§ 5801-5872, specifically 26 U.S.C. § 5861 (d), does
not require semiautomatic weapons to be registered.75 Therefore, an
unmodified AR-15 does not have to be registered.
Under the NFA, fully automatic weapons, however, must be regis-
tered.76 The M-16 is a fully automatic weapon, and therefore, it must
be registered. 77 Many of the M-16 parts are interchangeable with AR-
15 parts,78 and it is possible to use these parts to convert the AR-15
into a fully automatic weapon. To inhibit this conversion, AR-15 man-
ufacturers construct the gun with a metal stop on its receiver. 79 This
metal stop is designed to prevent an M-16 selector switch 8° installed
on an AR-15 from rotating to the fully automatic position.
8'
The AR-15 that the BATF agents found at Staples' home had
been modified.8 2 The metal stop had been filed away, and the rifle
contained several M-16 parts including a selector switch, a hammer, a
disconnector, and a trigger.83 Suspecting that Staples' weapon had
been modified to achieve fully automatic firing capability, the BATF
agents seized the weapon.84 Subsequently, Staples was indicted for
unlawful possession of an unregistered machine gun in violation of
70 Brief for Petitioner at 4, Staples v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 1793 (1994)(No. 92-
1441).
71 Staples v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 1793, 1795-96 (1994).
72 Id.
73 Id. at 1796.
74 Id.
75 The NFA requires registration of all "firearm[s]." 26 U.S.C. § 5861(d). The term
"firearm" covers all "machine gun[s]." 26 U.S.C. § 5845(a) (6). The NFA further defines a
"machine gun" as "any weapon which shoots... or can be readily restored to shoot, auto-
matically more than one shot, without manual reloading, by a single function of the trig-
ger." 26 U.S.C. § 5845(b).




80 The M-16 is a selective fire rifle that allows the operator to choose semiautomatic or







§ 5861 (d). 85
During the trial, BATF agents testified that Staples' AR-15 fired
more than one shot with a single pull of the trigger when it was
tested.8 6 Therefore, Staples' modified AR-15 was within the statutory
definition of a "machine gun."8 7 Furthermore, it was undisputed that
Staples' weapon was not registered as § 5861 (d) requires for all
"machine guns."88 Staples argued that because he was ignorant of his
weapon's automatic firing capability, he had not violated § 5861 (d).89
To support his claim, Staples testified that no one had ever fired the
rifle automatically while in his possession.90 He further testified that
his AR-15 could only operate semiautomatically. 91 He explained that
even when he fired his AR-15 semiautomatically, it fired imperfectly,92
often requiring manual ejection of the spent casing and manual
chambering of the next round.98 Consequently, Staples requested
jury instructions that would have forced the Government to prove be-
yond a reasonable doubt that Staples "knew that the gun would fire
fully automatically."9
4
Rejecting this request, the district court instead gave the follow-
ing jury instruction:
The Government need not prove the defendant knows he's dealing with
a weapon possessing every last characteristic [which subjects it] to the
regulation. It would be enough to prove he knows that he is dealing
with a dangerous device of a type as would alert one to the likelihood of
regulation. 9
5
Relying on this understanding of the law, the jury convicted
Staples of unlawful possession of an unregistered "firearm." 96 Subse-
quently, consistent with federal sentencing guidelines, the District
Court sentenced Staples to five years probation and a $5,000 fine.
9 7
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court's deci-
sion, stating that it was bound by its decision in United States v. Mit-
tleider.98 The court concluded that the Government "need not prove a
85 Id.
86 Id.
87 Id. at 1795 n.1; see supra note 75 (definition of a "machine gun").






94 Bried for Appellant, Appendix 1 at 42, United States v. Staples, 971 F.2d 608 (10th
Cir. 1992) (No. 91-5033).
95 Staples, 114 S. Ct. at 1796.
96 Id.
97 United States v. Staples, 971 F.2d 608, 609 (10th Cir. 1992).
98 835 F.2d 769 (10th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 980 (1988). Mitt/eider contained a
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defendant's knowledge of a weapon's physical properties to obtain a
conviction under § 5861 (d).'99
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari' 00 to resolve
the conflict among the Courts of Appeals concerning the proper
mens rea that § 5861 (d) requires. 1 1
IV. SUMMARY OF OPINIONS
A. THE MAJORITY OPINION
Writing for the majority,10 2 Justice Thomas disagreed with the
Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals. 03 Justice Thomas concluded that
§ 5861 (d) is subject to a mens rea requirement; namely, a person has
to know that his weapon falls within the statutory definition of a "fire-
arm," before he can violate the statute's requirements. 1
04
Justice Thomas started his analysis with a recognition that the de-
termination of a statute's mens rea is a matter of statutory construc-
tion.10 5 Therefore, Justice Thomas continued, the Court has to
examine § 5861(d)'s language to determine if Congress intended a
mens rea requirement. 106 Justice Thomas recognized that § 5861 (d)
provides little guidance since it does not mention any mens rea.
10 7
Section 5861(d) simply states that "[i] t shall be unlawful for any per-
son... to receive or possess a firearm which is not registered to him
in the National Firearms Registration and Transfer Record."10 8 Jus-
tice Thomas noted, however, that congressional silence is not determi-
native of whether mens rea is required. 10 9 He continued that in the
absence of congressional guidance, the statute must be construed "in
light of the background rules of the common law."110 Following the
principles of the common lawJustice Thomas determined that "[t]he
existence of a mens rea is the rule of, rather than the exception to,
the principles of Anglo-American criminal jurisprudence.""' Justice
fact pattern and jury instruction very similar to Staples' case. As a result, the Tenth Circuit
considered Mittleider controlling. Staples, 971 F.2d at 612-13.
99 Staples, 971 F.2d at 612-13.
100 Staples v. United States, 113 S. CL 2412 (1993).
101 Staples v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 1793, 1796 (1994).
102 Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia, Kennedy, and Souter joined in Justice
Thomas' opinion.
103 Staples, 114 S. Ct. at 1796.
104 Id. at 1804.
105 Id. at 1796.
106 Id. at 1796-97.
107 Id. at 1797.
108 26 U.S.C. § 5861(d) (1994).





Thomas further noted that in the past the Court has generally disfa-
vored construing offenses as not requiring any mens rea. n 2 As a re-
sult, Justice Thomas required either an express or implicit
congressional elimination of mens rea from an offense.113
Having established what rules govern the statutory interpretation
of § 5861 (d), Justice Thomas next addressed the Government's first
argument." 4 The Government argued that courts should not con-
strue § 5861 (d) as having a mens rea requirement because § 5861 (d)
is a public welfare or "regulatory" offense. 115 Justice Thomas, how-
ever, pointed out that the Court has only recognized public welfare
offenses in "limited circumstances."" 6 He continued that, typically,
such offenses regulate "potentially harmful or injurious items."" 7 In
those "limited circumstances," Justice Thomas said that the Court has
reasoned that the offender should have known that "he [was] dealing
with a dangerous device of a character that place[d] him 'in a respon-
sible relation to a public danger,'"" 8 and subsequently, he should
have been alerted to the probability that his use or ownership of that
item was strictly regulated." 9 Therefore, Justice Thomas concluded
that the Court must look to the "nature of the statute and the particu-
lar character of the item regulated" to determine if Congress intended
the statute to be a public welfare offense. 1
20
Having laid this foundation, Justice Thomas attacked the Govern-
ment's contention that courts should treat § 5861 (d) as a public wel-
fare offense for three reasons.121 First, the Government primarily
relied on the Supreme Court's holding in United States v. Freed'22 to
assert that § 5861 (d) was a public welfare offense.' 23 Justice Thomas
rejected this assertion because Freed did not address the same issue. 124
Justice Thomas explained that Freed merely decided that § 5861 (d)




116 Id. at 1798 (citing United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 437
(1978)).
117 Id.
118 Id. (citing United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, 281 (1943)).
119 Staples, 114 S. Ct. at 1798.
120 Id. The Government argued that § 5861 (d) qualified as a public welfare statute, and
mens rea should not be part of the offense. Id. The Government further argued that all
guns, whether or not they are statutory "firearms," are dangerous devices. This dangerous
nature of an item should alert the owner that these items are subject to strict regulation.
Id.
121 Id. at 1798-99.
122 401 U.S. 601 (1971).




did not require proof that the offender should have known that his
firearm was unregistered, while the issue in the instant case was
whether § 5861 (d) requires proof that the owner should have known
the particular characteristics of his weapon which make it a statutory
"firearm."125 Justice Thomas explained that "different elements of the
same offense can require different mental states";126 therefore, the
holding in Freed was inapposite. 127
Second, Justice Thomas attacked the Government's argument
that courts should consider § 5861 (d) a public welfare statute because
it regulates highly dangerous devices that should alert an owner to the
probability of strict regulation. 128 Justice Thomas rejected this argu-
ment because some gun ownership is not regulated strictly.129 Unlike
hand grenades or dangerous narcotics, some gun ownership has en-
joyed a long tradition of legality in this country. 30 Based on this tradi-
tion, Justice Thomas reasoned that one would not expect gun
ownership to be generally illegal, even though guns are dangerous
items.' 3 ' He explained further that guns are not the type of highly
dangerous item that should put an owner on notice that he stands "in
responsible relation to a public danger."132 He concluded, therefore,
that a gun owner would not be alerted to the probability of strict regu-
lation.133 Justice Thomas further pointed out that the Government's
argument ignored the considerable care the Court had taken in past
cases to avoid construing a statute as dispensing with mens rea if do-
ing so would "criminalize a broad range of apparently innocent
conduct."'34
Third, Justice Thomas highlighted the harsh penalty that
§ 5861 (d) imposes on offenders to further support his contention that
§ 5861 (d) is not a public welfare offense. 135 Justice Thomas explained
that public welfare offenses, since they dispense with a mens rea re-
quirement, impose light penalties and do "no grave damage to an of-
fender's reputation."136 Justice Thomas pointed out, however, that








132 Id. at 1800 (citing United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, 281 (1943)).
135 Id.
'34 Id. at 1799 (citing Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 426 (1985)).
135 Id. at 1802.
136 Id. at 1808.
'37 Id. at n.16. Title 18 U.S.C. § 8559 (1994) makes any crime punishable by more than
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prison sentence and a fine.' 38 Consequently, it cannot be a public
welfare offense. 139
Based on this analysis, Justice Thomas held that the district court
should have required the Government to prove that Staples knew his
weapon was a statutory "firearm." 140 Justice Thomas determined that
the common law rule favoring mens rea governed the interpretation
of § 5861 (d). 141 Justice Thomas emphasized, though, that his holding
was a narrow one.142 He further commented that the Court, in a situ-
ation such as this, must make a common-sense evaluation of the na-
ture of the item Congress has subjected to regulation, and the
expectations that individuals may legitimately have in dealing with this
regulated item. Justice Thomas concluded by stating that if "Congress
had intended to make outlaws of gun owners who were wholly igno-
rant of the offending characteristics of their weapons, and [intended
to] subject them to lengthy prison terms, it would have spoken more
clearly to that effect."
143
B. JUSTICE GINSBURG'S CONCURRENCE
Justice Ginsburg agreed with the majority that § 5861 (d) requires
a mens rea-i.e., a "knowledge"-requirement. 44 However, Justice
Ginsburg determined that a more specific explanation of the "knowl-
edge" involved was necessary.145 Accordingly, Justice Ginsburg identi-
fied three distinct levels of knowledge that could have been in issue:
"(1) knowledge simply of possession of the object; (2) knowledge, in
addition, that the object is a dangerous weapon; (3) knowledge, be-
yond dangerousness, of the characteristics that render the object sub-
ject to regulation, for example, awareness that the weapon is a
machine gun."' 46
Justice Ginsburg explained that the first level of knowledge,
knowledge simply of possession, would effectively dispense with mens
rea.147 This interpretation would criminalize "apparently innocent
conduct."' 48 Next, Justice Ginsburg identified that the Government
a year in prison a felony. Id.
138 26 U.S.C. § 5871 (1994). An offender can be sentenced to up to ten years in prison
and be fined not more than ten thousand dollars.





144 Justice O'Connor joined justice Ginsburg's opinion.
145 Staples, 114 S. Ct. at 1804-05 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in the judgment).
146 Id. at 1805 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in the judgment).
147 Id. (Ginsburg, J., concurring in the judgment).
148 Id. (Ginsburg,J., concurring in thejudgment). An example of "apparently innocent
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was arguing for the second level of knowledge, knowledge that the
object is a dangerous weapon. Justice Ginsburg concluded, however,
that the Government's argument failed because it did not "take ade-
quate account of the 'widespread lawful gun ownership' Congress and
the States have allowed to persist in this country."149 In support, she
pointed out that the nation's legislators require registration of a lim-
ited class of firearms, those they consider especially dangerous. 150
Therefore, she reasoned that only the third level of knowledge, knowl-
edge of the characteristics of the object which subject it to regulation,
satisfies the purpose of mens rea- namely, "to shield people against
punishment for apparently innocent activity."151 Applying this level of
knowledge to the facts of Staples' case, Justice Ginsburg concluded
that the Government should have had to prove that Staples knew he
possessed not simply a gun, but a machine gun.
152
C. JUSTICE STEVENS' DISSENT
Writing for the dissent,155 justice Stevens concluded that the ma-
jority had overstepped its bounds by construing § 5861 (d) to require
proof of mens rea.154 Justice Stevens determined that the language of
§ 5861 (d) and prior Supreme Court precedent clearly indicate that
§ 5861 (d) does not impose mens rea.155 Thus, Justice Stevens accused
the majority of adding to the text of the statute "[t]o avoid a slight
possibility of injustice to unsophisticated owners of machine guns and
sawed-off shotguns." 56 He also asserted that the majority was preoc-
cupied with guns that "generally can be owned in perfect inno-
cence."' 57 Justice Stevens pointed out that the weapon discovered at
Staples' home was a semiautomatic weapon that was readily converti-
ble into a machine gun: "a weapon that the jury found to be 'a dan-
gerous device of a type as would alert one to the likelihood of
regulation.'"'158 Consequently, he argued that the majority's focus on
guns that can be found in almost "50 percent of American homes" was
conduct" would be a defendant who possessed what he thought was a toy or violin case, but
which in fact was a machine gun. Id. (Ginsburg, J., concurring in the judgment). Justice
Ginsburg explained that this was the reason the Government did not advocate this knowl-
edge level. Id. (Ginsburg, J., concurring in the judgment).
149 Id. (Ginsburg, J., concurring in the judgment).
150 Id. (Ginsburg, J., concurring in the judgment).
151 Id. (Ginsburg, J., concurring in the judgment).
152 Id. at 1806 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in the judgment).
153 Justice Blackmun joined this dissenting opinion.
154 Staples, 114 S. Ct. at 1806 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
155 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
156 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
157 Id. (Stevens,J., dissenting).
158 Id. (Stevens,J., dissenting).
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irrelevant to Staples' case. 159
To support his analysis, Justice Stevens set forth three unambigu-
ous guideposts that he believed should have led the Court to the cor-
rect answer: (1) the text and structure of the NFA; (2) the Court's
cases construing both the NFA and similar regulatory legislation; and
(3) the NFA's history and interpretation.160
Focusing on the first guidepost, Justice Stevens began by noting
that § 5861 (d) does provide explicit guidance, contrary to the major-
ity's conclusion.' 61 He acknowledged that § 5861 (d) does not specify
a mens rea.162 However, he explained that the absence of an express
knowledge requirement is not dispositive; rather, it demonstrates that
Congress did not intend the Government to prove that the defendant
knew all of the facts that made his conduct illegal. 163 Justice Stevens
then provided a lengthy historical analysis of § 5861 (d) which led him
to conclude that § 5861(d) is "unquestionably" a public welfare of-
fense.164 He asserted that both the majority's and Justice Ginsburg's
conclusions were wrong, because both relied "erroneously" upon the
"tradition[al]" innocence of gun ownership in determining that
§ 5861 (d) was not a public welfare offense.' 65 He was also shocked
that the majority claimed that guns are more like food stamps than
hand grenades. 1
66
Justice Stevens then explained that the majority's error stemmed
from its mistaken belief that the Government argued that "all guns"
are dangerous devices that should put a gun owner on notice.167 The
majority, he claimed, should have limited the category of guns to
those similar to the petitioner's gun-semiautomatic weapons that are
readily convertible to machine guns. 68 This type of weapon should
159 Id. at 1807-08 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
160 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
161 Id. at 1807 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
162 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
163 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting) (discussing Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246
(1952) and citingJusticejackson: "[Glongressional silence as to mental elements in an Act
merely adopting into federal statutory law a concept of crime... well defined in common
law and statutory interpretation by the states may warrant quite contrary inferences than
the same silence in creating an offense new to general law, for whose definition the courts
have no guidance except the Act." 342 U.S. at 262.).
164 Id. at 1810. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
165 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
166 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting). The majority stated that some guns are more like the
food stamps in Liparota than the hand grenades in Freed because some guns have had a
history of legal ownership and someone would be surprised to find out that these guns are
strictly regulated. Id. at 1799.
167 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
168 Id. at 1811 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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put an owner on notice to the probability of strict regulation. 16 9
V. ANALYSIS
Justice Thomas properly held that 26 U.S.C. § 5861 (d) requires
mens rea, and that it is not a public welfare offense.17 0 However, this
Note argues that he failed to properly analyze the offense. He did not
analyze the objective elements of § 5861 (d) individually, and conse-
quently, did not determine the proper mens rea that § 5861 (d) re-
quires. As a result, his opinion is confusing and muddled. This Note
argues that an "element analysis" of § 5861 (d) would have been more
understandable and would have yielded the proper mens rea.
A. THE MAJOR SOURCE OF CONFUSION: JUSTICE THOMAS FAILED TO
ESTABLISH THE PROPER ANALYrICAL FRAMEWORK FOR
ANALYZING 26 U.S.C. § 5861(d)
Justice Thomas' analysis of § 5861 (d) is confusing and muddled
because he failed to establish the proper analytical framework before
starting his analysis.' 71 He started his analysis by recognizing that
§ 5861 (d) does not indicate the mens rea Congress intended. 72 How-
ever, as Justice Thomas correctly pointed out, Congressional silence is
not dispositive."73 From this point forward, his analysis faltered. Jus-
tice Thomas asserted that courts should construe § 5861 (d), as a
whole, "in light of the background rules of the common law."' 74 As a
result, he discussed § 5861 (d) as requiring only a single mens rea.175
He never individually examined the separate objective elements of
§ 5861 (d). In effect, Justice Thomas applied an "offense analysis" ap-
proach of statutory interpretation, as opposed to an "element analysis"
approach.'7 6 According to the "offense analysis" approach, a statute,
generally, has only a single mental state for the entire offense.'" In
contrast, the "element analysis" approach separates a statute into its
objective elements, and then links each objective element to a corre-
sponding culpability element. 78 The "offense analysis" approach has
169 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
170 Staples v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 1793, 1804 (1994).
171 See id. at 1796. Justice Thomas' analysis of § 5861(d)'s mens rea requirement starts
in Section H A of the opinion.




176 PAUL H. ROBINSON, FUNDAMENTAtS OF CuMINAL LAw 212 (1988).
177 Paul H. Robinson &Jane A. Grall, Element Analysis in Defining Criminal Liability: The
Model Penal Code and Beyond, 35 Stan. L. Rev. 681, 688 (1983).
178 ROBINSON, supra note 176, at 212. The objective elements of an offense are its con-
19951 1151
SUPREME COURT REVIEW
a number of pitfalls that the "element analysis" approach avoids. First,
"offense analysis" uses common law terms to define mens rea. 179 The
common law terms, however, are ambiguous.' 8 0 Second, since "of-
fense analysis" requires only one mental state for the entire offense, it
fails to recognize that each individual element of the offense may re-
quire a different culpability.18'
The Model Penal Code (MPG) was developed to address these
problems.' 82 The MPC introduced the previously discussed concept
of "element analysis" to criminal statute interpretation. 83 The MPC
made two enlightening realizations. First, as mentioned, it linked
each objective element of an offense with a corresponding culpability
element.8 4 Second, it pointed out that mens rea does not have a sin-
gle definition. 185 Rather, the MPC defines mens rea as several identi-
fiable and analytically distinct levels of intent.' 86 These distinct levels
are purpose, knowledge, recklessness, and negligence.' 87 As a result,
this method of analysis is more precise than the older, more ambigu-
ous "offense analysis" approach to statutory interpretation. 188 Had
Justice Thomas applied an MPC "element analysis" to § 5861 (d),
rather than an "offense analysis," his opinion would have been more
cogent, and would have reached different conclusions. 189
duct element, the results of the conduct, and any attendant circumstances. MODEL PENAL
CODE § 1.13(9) (Official Draft 1985).
179 ROBINSON, supra note 176, at 212.
180 Id.
181 Justice Thomas did acknowledge that the different elements of § 5861(d) may re-
quire different mens rea. Staples v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 1793, 1799 (1994). However,
this acknowledgement was superficial and was used only to refute the Government's argu-
ment that Staples' case was similar to Freed. Id. Justice Thomas did not use this distinction
to further his analysis. Id.




186 United States v. Freed, 401 U.S. 601, 613 (1971) (Brennan, J., concurring in the
judgment).
187 MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 (Official Draft 1985).
188 Robinson & Grall, supra note 177, at 683-85.
189 It is noted that Congress has not enacted the Model Penal Code, and it does not
control interpretation of federal criminal statutes. However, the Supreme Court has used
it as an analytical tool in past decisions. In United States v. Freed, Justice Brennan, in his
concurrence, used the MPC to set up and guide his analysis of § 5861(d). 401 U.S. 601,
613-16 (1971) (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment). In Leary v. United States, the
Supreme Court used the MPC to define the word "knowledge." 7395 U.S. 6, 46 n.93
(1969). In Turner v. United States, relying on Leay, the Supreme Court again used the
MPC to define "knowledge." 396 U.S. 398, 416 n.29 (1970). See also Liparota v. United
States, 471 U.S. 419, 423 n.5 (1985).
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B. COMPARISON OF ANALYSES OF 26 U.S.C. § 5861 (d)
The following section of this Note interprets § 5861 (d) according
to the MPC "element analysis" approach, and compares these results
to Justice Thomas' results. Initially, to apply the "element analysis"
approach, the offense must be broken down into its objective ele-
ments: the conduct, the result, and the circumstances. 190 Section
5861(d) reads: "[i]t shall be unlawful for any person to receive or
possess a firearm which is not registered to him in the National Fire-
arms Registration and Transfer Record."191 This offense has one con-
duct element, no result element, and two circumstance elements.
The conduct element is "to receive or possess." The first circumstance
element is "a firearm," and the second circumstance element is "not
registered to him in the National Firearms Registration and Transfer
Record."
1. "Element Analysis" of the Conduct Element: "To Receive or Possess"
Next, it is necessary to address separately the culpability level of
each individual objective element. First, the conduct element, "to re-
ceive or possess," requires a culpability level of "knowing" according to
MPC section 2.01(4).192 Therefore, a § 5861 (d) offender has to
"knowingly" possess a weapon. In Staples' case, he "knowingly" pos-
sessed the AR-15.193 As a result, this element of § 5861 (d) is not in
dispute. 19
4
190 MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.13(9) (Official Draft 1985). "The Code does not define 're-
suit' or 'circumstance'. It defines 'conduct,' but uses seemingly contradictory forms of that
term in different Code provisions. Section 1.13 takes a narrow view, suggesting that 'con-
duct' simply requires a bodily movement. Section 2.02, in contrast, uses 'conduct' in a
broad sense to mean bodily movement and all its relevant characteristics." Robinson &
Grall, supra note 177, at 707. As a result, this analysis will utilize the definitions that are
described in Element Analysis in Defining Criminal Liability: The Model Penal Code and Beyond
for these terms. Id. According to this article, "conduct" should be defined narrowly to
mean pure conduct. Id. at 719. "Result" elements are circumstances which are changed by
the actor. Id. at 724. "Circumstance" elements, then, would be all other elements. Id. For
a more detailed discussion of how to define the Model Penal Code's terms, see Robinson &
Grail, supra note 177.
191 26 U.S.C. § 5861(d) (1994).
192 MODEL PENAL CODE §2.01(4) (Official Draft 1985) states "[p]ossession is an act,
within the meaning of this Section, if the possessor knowingly procured or received the
thing possessed or was aware of his control thereof for a sufficient period to have been able
to terminate his possession."
193 Petitioner's Brief at 10, Staples v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 1793 (1994) (No. 92-1441).
194 Staples was also charged with possession of an M-1 .30 caliber World War II carbine
rifle. However, the jury found him not guilty on this count because he did not "knowingly"
possess the M-1. Id. at 5.
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2. "Element Analysis" of the First Circumstance Element: "A Firearm,"
The Critical Element
Second, determining the culpability of the first circumstance ele-
ment, "a firearm," is a more complicated task. This is the critical issue
in this case. Justice Thomas implicitly concluded that "knowing"
should be the culpability level for this objective element 19 5 Specifi-
cally, he said that the Government should have shown that Staples
"knew ... the features of his AR-15 that brought it within the scope of
the Act." 96 The MPC, on the other hand, would not have placed the
requisite culpability that high. Instead, according to section 2.02(3)
of the MPC, offenders would be liable if they were merely "reckless" as
to the first circumstance element' 97-i.e., if they consciously disre-
garded a substantial and unjustifiable risk that their weapon was sub-
ject to strict regulation-e.g., that the term "firearm" is statutorily
defined.' 98
Following this MPC approach, the more refined issue of the case
becomes whether Staples' modified AR-15 should have alerted him to
a probability of strict regulation-a probability high enough that for
him to disregard this fact was a substantial and unjustifiable risk. Jus-
tice Thomas ultimately addressed a similar question in his opinion.199
Justice Thomas framed his question as whether the gun Staples pos-
sessed was "potentially harmful and injurious" enough to the public
that it should have alerted Staples to the probability of strict regula-
tion.200 However, since Justice Thomas never clearly laid out his anal-
ysis, this issue became lost in the confusion of his opinion.
201
195 Staples v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 1793, 1804 (1994).
196 Id. (emphasis added).
197 MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(3) (Official Draft 1985): "Culpability Required Unless Other-
wise Provided. When the culpability sufficient to establish a material element of the offense
is not prescribed by law, such element is established if a person acts purposely, knowingly
or recklessly with respect thereto."
In other words, the minimum culpability of any undefined objective element is
"reckless."
198 Robinson & Grail, supra note 177, at 697, Chart I: Model Penal Code § 2.02(2) Cul-
pability Definitions: "Reckless as to Circumstance" equals "He consciously disregards a sub-
stantial and unjustifiable risk that the material element exists." I&. The MPC drafters
realized that by requiring at least reckless culpability towards the attendant circumstances,
a person would not be found liable for ignorance of the law, when the law served only to
define the attendant circumstance and not the offense. "It should be noted that the gen-
eral principle that ignorance or mistake of law is no excuse is usually greatly overstated; it
has no application when the circumstances made material by the definition of the offense
include a legal element .... The law involved is not the law defining the offense; it is some
other legal rule that characterizes the attendant circumstances that are material to the
offense." MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 cmt. 11 (Official Draft 1985).
199 Staples v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 1793, 1798 (1994).
200 Id.
201 See id. at 1798-1800.
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The task of determining what items should alert a person to the
probability of strict regulation is not clear cut. The items that are sub-
ject to strict regulation cover a spectrum of dangerousness. At one
end of the spectrum, items exist that are "potentially harmful and in-
jurious" 20 2 enough that mere possession should undoubtedly alert a
person to the probability of strict regulation. United States v. Freed20 3 is
such an example. In Freed, the defendant possessed hand grenades,
undeniably dangerous weapons.204 The Court reasoned that because
grenades are not entirely "innocent" in and of themselves, the defend-
ant should have known they were subject to strict regulation.205
At the other end of the spectrum, items exist that are innocuous
enough that no one would expect them to be subject to strict regula-
tion. In Liparota v. United States,206 for instance, the defendant pos-
sessed unauthorized food stamps. Food stamps are not particularly
dangerous items, and "can hardly be compared to a hand grenade."20 7
Therefore, the Court held that food stamps do not have any character-
istics that would alert a possessor to the probability of strict
regulation. 20
8
The weapon in Staples' possession, a modified AR-15 assault rifle,
falls somewhere between these two extremes. The characterization of
this middle ground is critical to determining what violates § 5861 (d).
Justice Thomas, though he never explicitly acknowledged it, at-
tempted to define this middle ground.20 9 Justice Thomas' definition
was not an inclusionary one; rather, he defined what items § 5861 (d)
should not cover.210 According to Justice Thomas, § 5861 (d) should
not cover items that have enjoyed a long tradition of widespread law-
ful acceptance in this country.21 ' Justice Thomas' exclusionary defini-
tion arguably coincides with the preceding MPC analysis. Items that
have enjoyed a long tradition of widespread lawful acceptance in this
202 Id.
203 401 U.S. 601 (1971).
204 Id. at 609.
205 Id.
206 471 U.S. 419 (1985).
207 Id. at 433.
208 Id.
209 Staples v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 1793, 1799 (1994).
210 Id.
211 Id. The Government's argument to the Court failed because it tried to encompass
too broad a group of weapons that should put a person on notice. The Government ar-
gued that "all guns" should put a person on notice to the probability of strict regulation.
Justice Thomas rejected the Government's argument because not "all guns" are illegal, and
a tradition of lawful private gun ownership has existed in this country for a long time. As a
result, Justice Thomas thought the Government's position would "criminalize a broad
range of apparently innocent conduct." Id.
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country would also not alert a person to a high probability of strict
regulation which, if disregarded, would be considered a substantial
and unjustifiable risk.
Based on his middle ground definition, Justice Thomas reasoned
that Staples might not have known that his AR-15 was subject to strict
regulation because guns have enjoyed a long tradition of widespread
lawful use in this country.21 2 Consequently, Justice Thomas con-
cluded that Staples did not have the intent required to violate
§ 5861 (d).213 Justice Thomas erred. Guns and AR-15's have enjoyed
a tradition of acceptance in this country; however, legal weapons that
have been visibly or knowingly altered have not enjoyed this lawful
tradition.214 Staples' modified AR-15 had a visible "fully automatic"
selector switch, and the weapon had a shiny spot on the receiver.215
Therefore, Staples could easily have seen that someone had tampered
with his AR-15, and evidence of tampering should have alerted him to
the probability of strict regulation. 216 According to the MPC analysis,
then, Staples did have the requisite intent under § 5861 (d). Staples
was reckless. He consciously disregarded a substantial and unjustifi-
able risk that the probability of strict regulation-i.e., that the term
"firearm" was statutorily defined-existed. Therefore, based on the
MPC, Justice Thomas' exclusionary definition should carry the caveat
that if an item that usually has enjoyed a lawful tradition has an irregu-
lar aspect to it,217 the possessor should be alerted to the probability of
strict regulation.
3. "Element Analysis" of the Second Circumstance Element: "Not
Registered to Him in the National Firearms and Transfer
Record"
The analysis of the second circumstance element is easier. The
212 Id. This interpretation of § 5861(d) creates a major loophole in the statute. Under
this interpretation, a person who has converted his weapon could claim that he did not
know it was converted, and thereby escape conviction.
213 Id. at 1804.
214 In 1986, Congress enacted the Firearms Owners' Protection Act (FOPA), Pub. L. No.
99-308. The FOPA amended the definition of "machine gun" in 26 U.S.C. § 5845(b) to
include "any part designed and intended solely and exclusively, or combination of parts
designed and intended, for use in converting a weapon into a machine gun, and any com-
bination of parts from which a machine gun can be assembled if such parts are in the
possession or under the control of a person."
215 Staples, 114 S. Ct. at 1796.
216 United States v. Staples, 971 F.2d 608, 613 (10th Cir. 1992).
217 For example, a weapon that has been visibly altered or tampered with, United States
v. Herbert, 698 F.2d 981, 987 (9th Cir. 1988) (stating in dicta that external modifications
might "alert one to the likelihood of regulation"), that was bought from an unlicensed gun
dealer, or that fired fully automatic instead of semiautomatic.
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second circumstance element is "not registered to him in the National
Firearms Registration and Transfer Record."218 Again, since a culpa-
bility is not mentioned, section 2.02(3) of the MPC inserts a "reckless"
standard. However, the Supreme Court specifically addressed this ele-
ment in United States v. Freed.219 The Supreme Court assigned absolute
liability to this element of § 5861 (d).220 This conclusion, however, is
not inconsistent with an MPC analysis. The MPC recognizes absolute
liability offenses.221 According to the MPC, when the legislature
Tneant a material element to have absolute liability, then sections 2.01
and 2.02 of the MPC do not apply. The second circumstance element
then, according to Freed and supported by the MPC, does not require
mens rea.222
In summary, § 5861 (d) requires mens rea under both analyses.
However, the "element analysis" approach recognizes three separate
mens rea. The conduct element, "to receive or possess," requires a
mens rea of "knowing." Staples satisfied this element. The first cir-
cumstance element, "a firearm," requires a mens rea of "recklessness."
Staples satisfied this element as well, since he was dealing with a visibly
modified weapon. Justice Thomas, however, disagreed on this conclu-
sion, and held that the mens rea required for this element is "know-
ing." Lastly, the second circumstance element, "not registered to him
in the National Firearms Registration and Transfer Record," requires
no mens rea according to the Supreme Court. Therefore, according
to an "element analysis," the MPC approach, Staples had the mens rea
that § 5861 (d) requires; however, according to an "offense analysis,"
Justice Thomas' approach, he did not.
c. 26 U.S.C. § 5861(d) IS NOT A PUBLIC WELFARE OFFENSE BECAUSE
ITS PENALTY IS TOO HARSH
Justice Thomas pointed to the harsh penalty of § 5861 (d) to
demonstrate that it is not a public welfare offense, and consequently,
to confirm his conclusion that § 5861 (d) requires mens rea.223 He
noted that § 5861 (d) is a felony,224 and historically, felonies cannot be
218 26 U.S.C. § 5861(d) (1994).
219 401 U.S. 601 (1971).
220 Id. at 607.
221 MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.05(1) (b) (Official Draft 1985) states: "The requirements of
culpability prescribed by sections 2.01 and 2.02 do not apply to: offenses defined by stat-
utes other than the Code, insofar as a legislative purpose to impose absolute liability for
such offenses or with respect to any material element thereof plainly appears."
222 Freed, 401 U.S. at 607.
223 Staples v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 1793, 1802 (1994). This argument is laid out in
Section II C of the opinion.
224 Id. at 1804. 18 U.S.C. § 3559 (1994) makes any crime punishable by more than one
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public welfare offenses. 225 Justice Thomas explained that historically,
to determine whether a statute was a public welfare offense, the courts
looked to the severity of the penalty that the statute imposed.226 Jus-
tice Thomas further explained that public welfare offenses usually
have "penalties [that] are relatively small, and conviction[s] [that do]
no grave damage to an offender's reputation."22 7 Felonies, however,
are "as bad a word as you can give to a man or thing."228
The MPC would support Justice Thomas' conclusion. The MPC
acknowledges absolute liability or public welfare offenses in section
2.05.229 The MPC further states that convictions for public welfare
offenses can only be "violations."230 According to the MPC, "viola-
tions" cannot "constitute a crime and conviction of a violation shall
not give rise to any disability or legal disadvantage based on conviction
of a criminal offense."231 As noted, conviction under § 5861 (d) is a
felony.23 2 Therefore, the MPC does not recognize § 5861 (d) as an
absolute liability offense and, as described in the previous section, re-
quires proof of mens rea for a § 5861(d) conviction. The MPC sup-
portsJustice Thomas' "common-sense" conclusion 233 that § 5861 (d) is
not an absolute liability, public welfare offense.
D. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN SEMIAUTOMATIC GUN REGULATION
On 13 September 1994, the Violent Crime Control and Law En-
year in prison a felony. A § 5861 (d) offender can be imprisoned to up to ten years.
225 Staples, 114 S. Ct. at 1802.
226 Id. at 1803. "[C]ommentators collecting the early cases have argued that offenses
punishable by imprisonment cannot be understood to be public welfare offenses, but must
require mens rea. See R. Perkins, Criminal Law 793-798 (2 ed. 1969) (suggesting that the
penalty should be the starting point in determining whether a statute describes a public
welfare offense); Sayre, supra [note 28], at 72 ('Crimes punishable with prison sentences
... ordinarily require proof of a guilty intent')." Id.
227 Staples, 114 S. Ct. at 1803 (citing Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 256
(1951)).
228 Id. (quoting 2 F. PoLLocK & F. MAITLAND, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAw 465 (2d ed.
1899)).
229 MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.05 (Official Draft 1985): When Culpability Requirements
Are Inapplicable to Violations to Offenses Defined by Other Statutes; Effect of Absolute
Liability in Reducing Grade of Offense to Violation.
230 MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.05(2) (a) (Official Draft 1985): "[W]hen absolute liability is
imposed with respect to any material element of an offense defined by a statute other than
the Code and a conviction is based upon such liability, the offense constitutes a violation."
231 MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.04(5) (Official Draft 1985). Additionally, the Model Penal
Code defines crimes "as felonies, misdemeanors or petty misdemeanors." MODEL PENAL
CODE § 1.04(1). Since the MPC is based on requiring mens rea, and § 2.02(3) reads in a
mens rea if an offense is missing one, this conclusion makes sense.
232 See supra note 224.
233 Staples v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 1793, 1804 (1994).
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forcement Act of 1994 became law.234 This Act has made possession
of all semiautomatic weapons illegal,23 5 unless they were owned legally
prior to enactment of the new law.2 3 6 Under the current law, posses-
sion of an AR-15 is now illegal, regardless of whether it has been con-
verted or not.237 The Government, under the new law, definitely
would not have had to prove mens rea to convict Staples. In fact,
Congress described in explicit detail the weapons this new amend-
ment covers.238 This new legislation effectively makes § 5861 (d)
moot, because registration is not possible if the weapon itself is illegal.
However, the preceding analysis still provides a useful framework for
analyzing other offenses which are silent as to the required mens rea.
VI. CONCLUSION
In Staples v. United States,239 the Court held that § 5861 (d) re-
quired proof that the defendant knew the characteristics of his weapon
that made it a statutory "firearm."24° The Court also held that items
234 Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108
Stat. 1796.
235 This Act amended 18 U.S.C. § 922 adding the new subsection (v) (1). "It shall be
unlawful for a person to manufacture,- transfer, or possess a semiautomatic assault
weapon." 26 U.S.C. § 5861(d), over the years, has essentially become moot due to the
addition of subsections (o) and (p) to 18 U.S.C. § 922. § 922(o) (1) states "it shall be
unlawful for any person to transfer or possess a machine gun," and § 922(p) (1) states "lilt
shall be unlawful for any person to ... possess .... any firearm-...." These amendments
were outright bans on "machine guns" and "firearms", thus, making a registration require-
ment irrelevant.
236 18 U.S.CA § 922(v) (2) (West Supp. 1994): "[Unlawful possession of a semiauto-
matic weapon] shall not apply to the possession ... of any semiautomatic assault weapon
otherwise lawfully possessed under Federal law on the date of the enactment of this
subsection."
237 18 U.S.CA § 921(a) (iv) (West Supp. 1994): "The term 'semiautomatic assault
weapon' means-Colt AR-15."
238 18 U.S.CA § 921(a) (80) (West Supp. 1994): The term 'semiautomatic assault
weapon' means-
(A) any of the firearms, or copies or duplicates of the firearms in any caliber, known
as-
(i) Norinco, Mitchell, and Poly Technologies Avtomat Kalashnikovs (all models);
(ii) Action Anns Israeli Military Industries UZI and Galil;
(iii) Beretta Ar7O (SC-70);
(iv) Colt AR-15;
(v) Fabrique National FN/FAL, FN/LAR, and FNC;
(vi) SWD M-10, M-11, M-11/9, and M-12;
(vii) Steyr AUG;
(viii) INTRATEC TEC-9, TEC-DC9 and TEC-22; and
(ix) revolving cylinder shotguns, such as (or similar to) the Street Sweeper and Striker
12;
(B) ....
239 114 S. Ct. 1793 (1994).
240 Id. at 1804.
SUPREME COURT REVIEW
that have enjoyed a long tradition of lawful acceptance in this country
would not alert a person to the probability of strict regulation. 24'
Based on the facts in this case, the Court specifically noted that guns
have enjoyed a tradition of legality in this country, and possession of a
gun would not alert a person to the probability of strict regulation. 242
Therefore, the Court concluded, the Government should not have
been able to convict Staples without proving that he knew the charac-
teristics of his weapon that made it a statutory "firearm."243 Justice
Thomas further held that § 5861 (d) is not a public welfare offense
because it is a felony,244 and public welfare offenses, historically, have
imposed small penalties and do not gravely damage a person's
reputation.24
5
Justice Thomas properly concluded that § 5861 (d) requires mens
rea and that it is not a public welfare statute. However, since Justice
Thomas applied an "offense analysis" to § 5861 (d), rather than an "el-
ement analysis," he failed to determine the actual mens rea that
§ 5861 (d) requires. According to an "element analysis," a Model Pe-
nal Code analysis, of § 5861 (d), § 5861 (d) actually requires three sep-
arate mens rea; one for each objective element. Section 5861 (d)
requires the following material elements: (1) "knowing" possession;
(2) "recklessness" as to the weapon being a statutory "firearm;" and
(3) no mens rea as to the registration status of the "firearm." There-
fore, for a § 5861 (d) conviction, the Government should have had to
prove only that Staples was "reckless" as to his weapon being a statu-
tory "firearm." Under this instruction, he would have probably been
convicted because he was "reckless" as to his weapon's status. His AR-
15 had visible modifications that should have alerted him to tamper-
ing and the probability of strict regulation.
The recently passed Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement




241 Id. at 1799.
242 Id.
243 Id. at 1804.
244 Id.
245 Id. at 1803.
246 See supra note 238.
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